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Abstract 
The conventional wisdom of electoral politics suggests that parliamentary candidates who run 
for office under candidate-centred mechanisms tend to conduct more intense and personalised 
campaigns than those who run under party-centred ones. But what about the campaigns put in 
place by candidates who simultaneously run under both systems? Using original data from 
the 2016 Welsh Candidate Study, this article shows that dual candidates’ campaign behaviour 
is distinct from that of their constituency and regional list counterparts. Their campaign effort 
tends to be more intense as well as complex than that put in place by candidates who stand in 
one tier only. In addition, the findings show that dual candidates’ campaign messages tend to 
be more personalised than those of regional list candidates, but less personalised than those of 
constituency candidates. These results indicate that the electoral campaigns put in place by 
dual candidates combine elements of campaigning under candidate-centred and party-centred 
electoral systems 
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Introduction 
Electoral institutions influence many aspects of political life. They have been shown to shape 
the composition as well as inner workings of political institutions through their effects on the 
representation of women and minorities, the effective number of political parties, government 
responsiveness, etc. (e.g., Farrell 2011; Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Paxton et al. 2010). 
Moreover, electoral institutions have been shown to influence the behaviour of parliamentary 
candidates, voters, and legislators (e.g., Karp and Banducci 2008; Sieberer 2010; Sudulich 
and Trumm 2017). In this article, I extend our understanding of electoral institutions and how 
they shape political processes by exploring how dual candidacy affects campaign behaviour. 
  
Dual candidacy is a common feature of mixed member systems. It allows candidates to stand 
for office simultaneously in multiple electoral tiers by seeking a personal mandate in a single 
member district as well as a regional mandate through a party list. Although there is variation 
in the implementation of dual candidacy across the different countries that use mixed member 
systems, the practice is used by the vast majority of them.1 Despite its prominence, however, 
dual candidacy is an understudied feature of mixed member systems. We still know very little 
about what kind of campaigns dual candidates tend to conduct in the run up to the polling day 
and, importantly, how these compare with the campaigns put in place by candidates who only 
stand in one electoral tier.  
 
This study uses original data from the 2016 Welsh Candidate Study to address this lacuna. It 
explores the effect of candidacy type on candidates’ campaign behaviour, focusing on their 
comparative campaign effort, campaign focus, and campaign complexity in the run up to the 
2016 devolved election in Wales.2 The analysis reveals some interesting behavioural patterns 
as dual candidates’ campaign choices tend to be distinct from those of their constituency and 
regional list counterparts. Dual candidates conduct more intense and complex campaigns, and 
use more balanced messaging, than candidates who stand in one electoral tier only. These 
effects hold when controlling for other explanatory characteristics. Dual candidacy is in fact a 
substantively distinct mode of candidacy when it comes to campaign behaviour and there are 
some clear empirical implications, in addition to normative ones, associated with the decision 
to permit dual candidacy or not. 
 
The article is organised as follows. In the next section, existing literature that is touched upon 
to guide my investigation is surveyed. I then outline my theoretical expectations, describe the 
                                                          
1 Notable exceptions include Taiwan, Thailand, and Ukraine. 
2 The 2016 devolved election in Wales offers a useful case for studying the campaign effects of candidacy type. 
First, all three candidacy types – constituency, regional list, and dual – were meaningfully represented in the full 
population of candidates. There was a total of 457 candidates, with 208 standing as regional list candidates, 153 
as constituency candidates, and 96 as dual candidates. Even the least popular category comprised of over 20% of 
all candidates. This allows for a meaningful analysis as no category of candidates is effectively a token category. 
Second, the election in question is one of the most recent parliamentary elections held in mixed member systems 
for which a candidate study has been conducted. This allows for an up-to-date analysis which findings reflect as 
current campaign dynamics as possible. Finally, while devolved elections in Britain still have low turnout levels, 
their ‘second order’ nature is significantly reduced by the strength of these administrations as they have primary 
legislative power over a range of policy areas and the strength of the sub-state identities in question (Jeffery and 
Hough 2009). 
data and the operationalisation of the variables. This is followed by the presentation of results 
from the empirical analysis. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of the implications 
that emerge from the empirical evidence. 
 
Literature review 
Mixed member systems rose to prominence in the early 21st-century. Promising to deliver the 
best of both worlds, they were seen to balance proportionality and small group representation 
associated with proportional systems and geographic representation of a particular locale and 
catch-all parties associated with majoritarian systems (Moser and Scheiner 2012; Shugart and 
Wattenberg 2001). Mixed member systems became popular among academics (Bowler et al. 
2005; Bowler and Farrell 2006), but also the electoral system of choice for many countries 
that opted for electoral reform. Although there has been a decline in the number of countries 
that have switched to a mixed member system in recent years, it remains an important family 
of electoral systems (Massicotte 2011). Today, around thirty countries use some version of a 
mixed member system (Batto and Cox 2016; Manow 2015), including such diverse cases like 
Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Mexico, New Zealand, South Korea, and Venezuela.  
 
The prominence of mixed member systems unsurprisingly led to a surge in academic interest 
in the electoral system. On the one hand, there is a theoretically-motivated body of literature. 
It has explored the virtues and drawbacks of mixed member systems, offered a classification 
of different mixed member systems, and compared them with other electoral system families 
(Baws and Thiem 2003; Massicotte and Blais 1999; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). On the 
other hand, there is an empirically-motivated body of literature. Whereas some scholars have 
explored the systematic effects associated with mixed member systems – effective number of 
parties (Barker and McLeay 2000; Nishikawa and Herron 2004), legislative turnover (Manow 
2007), electoral efficiency (Shugart 2001), party system fragmentation (Kostadinova 2002; 
Riera 2013) –, others have examined their behavioural effects on parliamentarians (Manow 
2013; Olivella and Tavits 2014; Sieberer 2010), political parties (Gschwend and Zittel 2016; 
Manow 2015), and voters (Gschwend et al. 2003; Moser and Scheiner 2009; Plescia 2016). 
Despite this growing body of literature, dual candidacy and its effect on candidates’ electoral 
campaigns, however, remains an understudied feature of mixed member systems. 
 
It is common in mixed member systems to permit dual candidacy whereby candidates can run 
for office in two electoral tiers simultaneously. The ability to run as a dual candidate may, in 
turn, have implications for politicians’ electoral campaigns and legislative activities. Whereas 
existing research into the latter is well-developed (e.g., Battle 2011; Bradbury and Mitchell 
2007; Ferrara 2004; Ohmura 2014; Thames 2005), very few studies have focused on the pre-
election period and explored how candidacy type influences candidates’ campaign behaviour 
in mixed member systems. Those that do, explore the effects associated with the lowest level 
of candidacy and do not distinguish dual candidates from the rest (Chiru 2015) or undertake 
somewhat limited bivariate analyses without checking whether the effects of candidacy type 
remain salient when controlling for other explanatory characteristics (Rich 2013; Wüst et al. 
2006).3 Very little is still known about how candidacy type, and dual candidacy in particular, 
shapes the level and nature of information that voters receive from candidates in the run up to 
the polling day in mixed member systems. 
 
How does the intensity and complexity of the campaign effort put in place by dual candidates 
compare with that of their constituency and regional list counterparts? What kind of messages 
do different types of candidates put forward in their campaign? It is important to address both 
questions to understand whether and, if so, how permitting dual candidacy influences the way 
that voters experience electoral campaigns in mixed member systems. 
 
Hypotheses 
The conventional wisdom in election literature is that electoral institutions play a significant 
role in shaping the level of campaign effort candidates put in place and voters are subjected to 
in the run up to the polling day (e.g., Karp and Banducci 2007; Karp et al. 2008; Sudulich and 
Trumm 2017).4 Specifically, candidate-centred electoral mechanisms are believed to promote 
greater campaign effort than party-centred electoral mechanisms as the former put a stronger 
onus on individual candidates to engage with voters and promote their campaign in the run up 
to the polling day.5 The link between one’s campaign effort and chances of getting elected is 
simply much more explicit and direct in systems where personal appeal and votes determine 
who gets elected. Candidates in such systems know they must maximise their personal profile 
and establish personal ties with constituents to enhance their chances of getting elected, while 
candidates in party-centred systems can rely to a greater degree on their party’s campaign and 
votes to win a seat. In terms of the devolved elections in Wales, this would lead one to expect 
greater campaign effort on the part of constituency candidates than regional list candidates as 
the former run under SMD and the latter under closed list PR rules. 
 
The situation regarding dual candidates, however, is not as straightforward. These candidates 
are running simultaneously as constituency candidates in single member districts and regional 
list candidates in multi member districts under closed list PR. Unlike their counterparts who 
run in a single electoral tier, dual candidates effectively have two constituencies and two sets 
of electorates to appeal to. They must promote their own reputation and profile in the single 
member constituency to enhance the likelihood of winning a constituency mandate, but they 
also have an incentive to promote their party image in the larger region to have better chances 
of obtaining a regional mandate via the party list. Even if dual candidates are ranked too low 
on their party list to have any realistic chance of getting elected through the party list route at 
the given election, they still have an incentive to put in some effort to promote their party. It 
is reasonable for candidates to believe that promoting their party image is seen favourably by 
their party, local and national, which in turn is likely to improve their chances of being given 
a higher ranking at a future election and their likelihood of getting elected. Given that dual 
                                                          
3 It is also worth noting that the studies by Chiru (2015) and Rich (2013) look exclusively at campaign focus and 
do not study the effect of candidacy type on candidates’ campaign effort or complexity. 
4 The study by Bowler and Farrell (2011) is an exception as it does not find electoral institutions to significantly 
influence candidates’ campaign effort when focusing on the 2004 European Parliament election. 
5 See, for example, Karp and Banducci 2007, Sudulich and Trumm 2017, or Wüst et al. 2006. 
candidates must campaign on two electoral fronts, engaging with two sets of electorates, it is 
reasonable to expect that their campaign effort exceeds that of their constituency and regional 
list counterparts. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Candidacy type affects campaign effort as follows: (a) constituency candidates 
undertake more intense campaigns than regional list candidates; and (b) dual candidates 
conduct most intense campaigns. 
 
Another element of campaigning that is most likely influenced by candidacy type is the focus 
of candidates’ campaign messages. Whereas all candidates seek to get out the vote and win 
votes, electoral systems are different in terms of whom voters ultimately cast their ballot for. 
The theoretical expectations here are intuitive; candidate-centred electoral mechanisms ought 
to encourage more candidate-focused campaigning, while party-centred electoral mechanisms 
should encourage more party-focused campaigning.6 The aim of any electoral campaign is to 
win votes. Therefore, it is rational for candidates to promote their party image when it is party 
votes that ultimately decide the electoral outcome (e.g., closed list PR) and their own profile 
when the importance of personal votes determines who gets elected (e.g., SMD). In terms of 
the devolved elections in Wales, this would lead one to expect more personalised campaigns 
from constituency candidates than regional list candidates. 
 
Dual candidates, once again, must respond to two different incentives. On the one hand, their 
campaigns should be highly personalised as it is ultimately their own profile and the number 
of personal votes won in the single member constituency that determine whether they receive 
a constituency mandate or not. On the other hand, their campaigns should also focus heavily 
on their party image as it is the performance of their party that determines how many regional 
mandates are distributed among its candidates in the given multi member district. Therefore, 
dual candidates’ campaign messages are likely to be more balanced in their focus than those 
of candidates who stand in one electoral tier only. Whereas constituency candidates have an 
incentive to prioritise their own image and regional list candidates have an incentive to raise 
the profile of their party, dual candidates have incentives to focus on both. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Candidacy type affects campaign focus as follows: (a) constituency candidates 
conduct most personalised campaigns; and (b) dual candidates conduct less candidate-
centred campaigns than constituency candidates but more candidate-centred campaigns 
than regional list candidates. 
 
Candidates may also differ in how they campaign. After all, single member districts in Wales 
are much smaller in terms of their geographical size and number of voters than multi member 
regions. The former also encourage candidates to undertake more personalised campaigning 
than the latter. It is highly likely that candidates choose campaign activities that allow them to 
maximise the effectiveness of their campaign effort. It is the more traditional campaign tools 
                                                          
6 Existing empirical evidence supports these expectations (e.g., Giebler and Wessels 2013; Sudulich and Trumm 
2017; Wüst et al. 2006; Zittel and Gschwend 2008). 
that reach people in their homes, e.g., canvassing and leafleting, that constituency candidates 
are likely to find particularly appealing. These campaign activities are very useful for making 
personal appeals to voters and conveying a sense of localness, whilst their resource-intensive 
nature is less demanding in smaller single member constituencies. At the same time, the more 
impersonal campaign activities like media advertisements or social media announcements are 
likely to be particularly attractive to regional list candidates as they reach a broader audience. 
These campaign activities are well-suited for targeting a large and disperse electorate, whilst 
their impersonal nature is less of a concern for candidates who do not rely on personal votes 
to get elected. Taken together, constituency candidates are more likely to rely on the personal 
campaign activities and regional list candidates on the impersonal ones, but the overall range 
of campaign tools used is likely to be similar for these types of candidates. 
 
As for dual candidates, they have strong incentives to engage with door-to-door campaigning 
as well as the more far-reaching, but less personal, campaign activities. Whereas the former is 
more effective in promoting one’s personal profile and lobbying for a personal vote in a small 
constituency, the latter enable candidates with greater ease to promote their party in the larger 
regional district. Given that dual candidates must engage with two sets of voters, and these 
are best reached via different communication channels, it is likely that they choose to utilise a 
wider range of campaign activities than candidates who stand in a single electoral tier. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Candidacy type affects campaign complexity as follows: (a) constituency and 
regional list candidates undertake equally complex campaigns; and (b) dual candidates 
conduct most complex campaigns. 
 
Data and methods 
The theoretical expectations are evaluated using original data from the 2016 Welsh Candidate 
Study.7 It is a comprehensive post-election survey of candidates who stood for election to the 
National Assembly for Wales in 2016 and includes several questions about their campaign 
behaviour. The survey was implemented in dual mode – online and paper – and language – 
English and Welsh – to maximise the response rate and obtain a balanced set of responses. In 
addition, candidates were assured that their responses are treated confidentially to ensure they 
feel able to reveal their underlying preferences which are unfiltered by strategic calculations, 
and candidates could leave certain questions unanswered if they wished to do so. The sample 
includes 159 candidates (35% response rate). It is representative as the proportion of different 
types of candidates is similar in the sample and the full population of candidates as is also the 
case with the distribution of partisanship and electoral success.8 
 
                                                          
7 The 2016 Welsh Candidate Study provides a first opportunity to systematically compare the campaign choices 
of dual candidates with those of constituency and regional list candidates in Wales. Dual candidacy was banned 
at the 2007 and 2011 devolved elections, and no individual-level data allowing for such analysis is available on 
candidates’ campaign behaviour at the 1999 and 2003 elections when the practice was permitted. The novelty of 
this data offers a unique opportunity for enhancing our understanding of campaign behaviour in mixed member 
systems. However, it does also highlight the need to replicate this analysis for future elections when the practice 
of dual candidacy has become a more established element of the electoral system in Wales. 
8 Further information about the 2016 Welsh Candidate Study is provided in Appendix A. 
The reliance on survey data and candidates’ self-perceived campaign behaviour offers unique 
research opportunities, but it also calls for caution. Scholars have pointed out that survey data 
can be subject to response bias, a prime example being the frequent over-reporting of turnout 
(Ansolabehere and Hersh 2012). While it is impossible to validate candidates’ self-perceived 
campaign behaviour, there is evidence to support the reliability of the survey data. It has been 
shown that the views expressed by successful candidates in the 2016 Welsh Candidate Study 
are in fact consistent with their subsequent parliamentary activity (Trumm 2018). In addition, 
the responses to the 2016 Welsh Candidate Study that can be validated – e.g., candidacy type, 
demographics, use of campaign website – show no response bias for those respondents whose 
survey responses can be compared with verified data. Assuring candidates that their answers 
are not released in a way that allows the identification of respondents meant that they had no 
one to please through their answers and were able to disclose their unfiltered views.  
 
Dependent variables 
In line with the theoretical approach, survey measures from the 2016 Welsh Candidate Study 
are identified to capture campaign effort, campaign focus, and campaign complexity. Starting 
with campaign effort, it is measured as the number of hours per week each candidate spent on 
her campaign during the last month of the campaign period, ranging from 0 to 105.9 This is 
preferred to campaign spending as official candidate spending data compiled by the Electoral 
Commission for the 2016 devolved election covers spending in single member constituencies 
only. The number of hours captures the campaign effort of all types of candidates, whilst still 
representing a reliable and widely used proxy for the intensity of one’s campaign effort (e.g., 
Bowler and Farrell 2011; Sudulich and Trumm 2017; Wüst et al. 2006). 
 
Campaign focus captures the actual content of a candidate’s campaign. This measure is based 
on a survey question that directly addresses the primary aim of one’s campaign, ranging from 
0 ‘to attract as much attention as possible to me as a candidate’ to 10 ‘to attract as much 
attention as possible to my party’. Higher values indicate more party-centred messaging. It is 
a widely established indicator used by the Comparative Candidate Survey project (2018) and 
studies of campaigning (e.g., Giebler and Wessels 2013; Zittel and Gschwend 2008), offering 
an insight into the kind of messages that candidates convey through their campaign effort. 
 
Finally, campaign complexity taps into how candidates campaign. It is an index that describes 
how many campaign activities, from the following options, candidates used as part of their 
campaign: i) canvassing, ii) leafleting, iii) engaging with media, iv) debating in public, and v) 
social networking.10 These campaign activities capture a broad range of the different types of 
campaign activities that candidates utilise, including localised door-to-door campaigning that 
requires candidates to make direct contact with voters on their doorstep, the promotion of 
one’s candidacy in public, and campaign advertisement using both traditional and new forms 
of media.11 As a result, campaign complexity provides a good overview of how broad range 
                                                          
9 Responses over 105 hours are treated as measurement error and excluded from the analysis. 
10 The use of an index, based on whether candidates employed various campaign activities, to capture campaign 
complexity has been utilised in cross-national studies of campaign behaviour (Sudulich and Trumm 2017). 
11 Non-response was low for all campaign activities that form the campaign complexity index. 
of communication channels candidates used to reach voters. It ranges from 0 to 5, with higher 
values indicating a more complex campaign. 
 
Key explanatory variables and controls 
The key explanatory variable in this study, candidacy type, is a categorisation of candidates 
by the nature of their candidacy. It differentiates between 1 ‘dual candidates’, 2 ‘constituency 
candidates’, and 3 ‘regional list candidates’. The categorisation of candidates is derived from 
the official Statement of Persons Nominated notices.12 
 
The analyses also control for the effects associated with other individual-level characteristics 
that have been shown to be relevant for explaining campaign behaviour.13 First, I account for 
candidates’ self-perceived electoral prospect.14 It is likely that the more confident a candidate 
is of her electoral chances, the stronger her incentives are to conduct a high intensity as well 
as personalised campaign. At the same time, candidates who do not expect to get elected have 
much weaker incentives to put in extra campaign effort and should opt for more party-centred 
campaigns to further their own position within their party and improve the electoral chances 
of their co-partisans. Likelihood of success describes candidates’ self-perceived likelihood of 
getting elected before their campaign had started, ranging from 1 ‘unlikely’ to 3 ‘likely’.15 
 
Second, candidates’ political experience is accounted for.16 Past AM captures whether a 
candidate had served in the National Assembly for Wales at any point before the 2016 
devolved election (coded 1) or not (coded 0).17 Candidates with more prominent political 
backgrounds should be inclined to invest more time and resource into their campaign and, 
given their relatively high-profile status, should have somewhat easier access to the various 
                                                          
12 The 2016 Welsh Candidate Study data show that some, albeit very few, candidates who officially ran in both 
electoral tiers claimed to have campaigned in one of the electoral tiers only. I ran models where these candidates 
are coded as constituency or regional list candidates as a further robustness check (see Appendix B). 
13 There is already an extensive body of literature on candidates’ campaign behaviour. It includes cross-national 
studies (e.g., Bowler and Farrell 2011; Giebler and Wessels 2013; Giebler and Wüst 2011; Sudulich and Trumm 
2017), single country studies focusing on mixed member systems (e.g., Gschwend and Zittel 2015; Zittel 2009; 
Zittel and Gschwend 2008), and single country studies focusing on other electoral systems (e.g., De Winter and 
Baudewyns 2015; Fisher and Denver 2008). 
14 Expected electoral success has been shown to positively influence campaign personalisation (e.g., De Winter 
and Baudewyns 2015; Sudulich and Trumm 2017; Zittel and Gschwend 2008), campaign intensity (e.g., Giebler 
and Wüst 2011; Sudulich and Trumm 2017), and campaign complexity (Sudulich and Trumm 2017).  
15 It is important to note that, given the data derive from a post-election survey, candidates were aware whether 
they had got elected or not when describing their electoral prospects before their campaign had started. Whereas 
it is not possible to validate responses to the survey question on electoral prospects, the presence of respondents 
who got elected despite having believed they had no chance of getting elected and respondents who did not get 
elected despite having believed they were likely to get elected offers some indication that respondents’ views on 
their electoral prospects are not determined by their electoral success (or lack thereof). In addition, please note 
that estimates from models that exclude the likelihood of success variable are robust to those presented here and 
available upon request. 
16 Existing evidence regarding the relevance of political experience in shaping campaign behaviour is somewhat 
mixed. Whereas the study by Giebler and Wüst (2011) finds political experience to positively shape candidates’ 
campaign effort and the study by Sudulich and Trumm (2017) finds it to have a positive effect on both campaign 
effort and complexity, others have not found significant effects associated with political experience (Bowler and 
Farrell 2011; Giebler and Wessels 2013; Zittel and Gschwend 2008).  
17 Estimates from models where Past AM is operationalised as incumbents (coded 1) versus challengers (coded 
0) are robust to those presented here and available upon request. 
means that can be used to contact voters. In addition, it is shown that political profile is an 
electoral asset for candidates (e.g., Redmond and Regan 2015; Smith 2013; Sudulich et al. 
2011). It is reasonable to expect that candidates want to make the most of this advantage in 
their electoral campaign which, in turn, leads to a more personalised campaign. 
 
Third, candidate’s campaign behaviour may be influenced by her relationship with her party. 
Namely, the further away a candidate’s own views and policy positions are from those of her 
party, the more imperative it is for her to conduct a personalised campaign and to put in extra 
campaign effort to get her own views across to the electorate. It is simply more important for 
these candidates to convey their distinctive messages to potential voters. Ideological distance 
is measured as the absolute difference between the left-right position of the candidate and that 
of her party, as perceived by the candidate.18 It ranges from 0 ‘no difference’ to 10 ‘complete 
disagreement’. 
 
Finally, I control for gender, with female candidates coded as 1 and male candidates coded as 
2, and party fixed effects. In terms of the latter, distinct codes are given to parties that gained 
representation following the 2016 devolved election, while all other parties are grouped under 
a separate ‘other’ category. 
 
Empirical strategy 
Given the different data structure of the dependent variables, different estimation techniques 
are used to explain variation in the various aspects of campaign behaviour. The ordinary least 
squares method is used to study variation in candidates’ campaign effort and campaign focus, 
whereas ordered probit is used to analyse variation in their campaign complexity. 
 
Findings 
I start examining whether candidacy type influences one’s campaign behaviour by comparing 
the mean values of dependent variables for the different types of candidates. Table 1 presents 
their mean campaign effort, campaign focus, as well as campaign complexity. It also displays 
the findings of the corresponding difference of means tests. 
 
This initial comparison reveals some interesting variation in candidates’ campaign behaviour. 
It is dual candidates who stand out in terms of campaign effort and complexity. They spend, 
on average, over 15 hours more per week campaigning than constituency candidates (48.6 vs 
33.1) and almost 30 hours more than regional list candidates (48.6 vs 18.8). Their campaigns 
also tend to use a broader range of campaign activities than those of constituency candidates 
(4.4 vs 3.7) and regional list candidates (4.4 vs 2.8). Both sets of differences are statistically 
significant at p<0.05 level. Looking at campaign focus, however, a slightly different picture 
emerges as dual candidates seem to conduct more balanced campaigns than their constituency 
and regional list counterparts. On average, their campaigns are more party-centred than those 
of constituency candidates (6.8 vs 5.0), but more candidate-centred than those of regional list 
                                                          
18 It is standard practice in campaigning literature to capture ideological distance through differences in left-right 
positions (e.g., Bowler and Farrell 2011; Giebler and Wessels 2013; Zittel 2009). 
candidates (6.8 vs 8.1). These differences are also statistically significant at p<0.05 level. 
These patterns are in line with the theoretical expectations and offer a first-cut indication that 
candidacy type matters when it comes to explaining candidates’ campaign behaviour. 
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
 
Candidacy type influences candidates’ campaign effort and focus 
I now move on to the multivariate analyses. First, I look at whether candidacy type continues 
to influence candidates’ campaign effort and focus when additional exploratory variables are 
accounted for. Findings from these models are presented in Table 2. 
 
The findings provide consistent support for the theoretical expectations. It is dual candidates 
who tend to produce campaigns of highest intensity. The negative and significant coefficients 
of -15.81 and -23.93 for constituency and regional list candidates, respectively, indicate that 
both types of candidates put in less hours of campaigning per week in the immediate run up 
to the polling day than dual candidates. Holding everything else constant, the predicted value 
for campaign effort rises from 22.3 hours per week for regional list candidates to 30.4 hours 
per week for constituency candidates, and to 46.2 hours per week for dual candidates. It is, as 
expected, dual candidates who tend to conduct campaigns of greatest intensity when looking 
at time spent on campaigning.  
 
In terms of the other explanatory characteristics, a few also contribute to explaining variation 
in campaign effort. The positive coefficient of 8.56 for the likelihood of success indicates that 
candidates who are more confident in their electoral chances prior to campaigning tend to put 
in greater campaign effort than those who do not expect to succeed, whereas the negative 
coefficient of -8.05 for gender shows that men tend to commit fewer hours to their campaigns 
than women. Finally, there are some interesting observations when looking at party effects. I 
do not find significant differences in the campaign effort of Welsh Labour candidates on the 
one hand and that of Plaid Cymru or Welsh Liberal Democrats candidates on the other hand, 
but the campaign effort put in place by Welsh Labour candidates is more intense than that of 
candidates who belong to the other parties. 
 
Moving on to campaign focus, candidacy type also seems to play a part in understanding how 
party- and candidate-centred candidates’ campaign messaging is. The negative coefficient of 
-1.33 for constituency candidates indicates that constituency candidates tend to undertake less 
party-centred campaigns than dual candidates. At the same time, the positive coefficient of 
1.53 for regional list candidates means that they conduct more party-centred campaigns than 
dual candidates. The nature of campaign messages put forward by dual candidates appears to 
effectively be a mix of those put forward by candidates who are standing in one electoral tier 
only. Holding everything else constant, the predicted value for campaign focus rises from 5.2 
for constituency candidates to 6.5 for dual candidates, and to 8.0 for regional list candidates. 
Dual candidates opt for a ‘middle of the road’ strategy. Their campaigns are not as candidate-
centred as those of constituency candidates, but also not as party-centred as those of regional 
list candidates. This pattern is in line with the theoretical expectations set out earlier. In terms 
of the other explanatory variables, the only significant effect observed is that candidates from 
parties that did not win representation in the National Assembly for Wales following the 2016 
election conducted more party-centred campaigns than Welsh Labour candidates.  
 
Taken together, candidacy type clearly plays an important role in explaining some of the key 
strategic decisions that candidates need to make about their campaign effort; its intensity and 
focus. Interestingly, the choices of dual candidates do not conform to those associated with 
constituency candidates or regional list candidates. Their campaign behaviour is characterised 
by higher intensity campaign effort and more balanced campaign focus. What it means is that 
the public discourse on dual candidacy, which has so far centred around normative arguments 
on the morality of permitting candidates to run in multiple electoral tiers simultaneously19, 
should feature more prominently the practical consequences of such a choice. Permitting dual 
candidacy has a positive effect on the overall campaign effort that candidates put in place in 
the run up to the polling day, if the total number of candidates is not reduced as a result20, and 
encourage campaigns that use balanced messages which are not as party-focused as those of 
regional list candidates nor as candidate-focused as those of constituency candidates. 
 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
Candidate type affects how candidates campaign 
Next, I examine whether candidacy type influences how candidates choose to campaign. It is 
plausible that candidates not only vary their overall campaign effort and campaign focus, but 
also differ in the range of campaign activities they utilise as part of their campaign. Table 3 
presents findings from the model that explains candidates’ campaign complexity. Note first 
that candidacy type is clearly relevant to explaining how broad range of communication tools 
candidates use to reach voters. The negative and significant coefficients of -0.76 and -1.34 for 
constituency candidates and regional list candidates, respectively, indicate that both types of 
candidates use a narrower range of campaign activities as part of their campaign effort than 
dual candidates. The predicted probability of running a high complexity campaign, i.e., using 
all five campaign activities that form the index, declines from 64.3% for dual candidates to 
37.3% for constituency candidates, and to as low as 19.9% for regional list candidates. At the 
same time, the predicted probability of not using any of the five campaign activities increases 
from 0.7% for dual candidates to 4% for constituency candidates, and to 11.1% for regional 
list candidates. The range of campaign activities used by different candidates to reach voters 
varies considerably. It is dual candidates who tend to use the widest range of communication 
tools as part of their campaign effort. 
                                                          
19 It is argued by some that dual candidacy devalues the integrity of the electoral system as it allows for losers to 
become winners by making it possible for defeated constituency candidates to get elected via regional party lists 
(Hain 2014), while others claim that this stance represents a fundamental misunderstanding of mixed member 
systems as its two tiers lead to two inherently different types of mandates (Scully 2014). 
20 Evidence from past devolved election in Wales does not indicate that permitting dual candidacy depresses the 
total number of candidates. Whereas the total number of candidates has fluctuated across the elections, it has not 
been systematically lower when dual candidacy has been permitted. For example, the total number of candidates 
was marginally lower in 2016 than it had been in 2007, but at the same time slightly higher than it was in 2011.  
 Campaign complexity, however, is not just a function of candidacy type. Gender also plays a 
role, with the negative coefficient of -0.49 indicating that men tend to use a narrower range of 
campaign activities than women. Finally, some party effects are evident. I find no significant 
differences in the campaign complexity of Welsh Labour candidates on the one hand and that 
of Plaid Cymru or Welsh Conservatives candidates on the other hand, but candidates from the 
other parties utilise a narrower range of campaign activities than Welsh Labour candidates. 
 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
It is possible that differences in campaign complexity across the different types of candidates 
are not equally driven by the five campaign activities that form the index. Table 4 shows the 
percentage of candidates, by candidacy type, who used each campaign activity accounted for 
in this study during their electoral campaign. 
 
Dual candidates, as expected, stand out in their use of different campaign activities. They are 
most likely to use four of the five campaign activities. The exception here is leafleting, which 
was used by a marginally higher percentage of constituency candidates than dual candidates 
(78.9% vs 78.1%). There is, however, significant variation in the relevance of candidacy type 
across the different campaign activities. It appears that the likelihood of using campaign tools 
that reach voters at home, i.e., canvassing and leafleting, does not vary by candidacy type. At 
the same time, candidacy type clearly influences the use of campaign activities that are more 
impersonal. Dual candidates are significantly more likely to engage with media activities than 
constituency and regional list candidates (97% vs 73.5% vs 55.4%), debate in public (97% vs 
63.5% vs 36.9%), and campaign on social networking sites (91.2% vs 76.9% vs 57.6%). Dual 
candidates’ tendency to conduct more complex campaigns than constituency and regional list 
candidates appears to be driven by their greater likelihood of employing the more impersonal 
campaign activities that do not reach voters at their doorstep. 
 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
Conclusions 
Electoral institutions influence many aspects of our political life. They can have an impact on 
the kind of political institutions we end up with, the nature of the party system, the promotion 
of political engagement, how well women and minorities are represented, etc. We also know 
that electoral institutions influence the behaviour of parliamentary candidates as SMD-only 
candidates tend to conduct more intense and personalised campaigns than PR-only candidates 
(Sudulich and Trumm 2017). But what about those candidates who simultaneously run under 
both systems? Despite the growing popularity of dual candidacy and mixed member systems, 
we still know very little about how the campaign behaviour of dual candidates compares with 
that of their constituency and regional list counterparts. 
 
This study explores the effects of candidacy type on the campaign behaviour of parliamentary 
candidates. Using original survey data from the 2016 Welsh Candidate Study, it compares the 
campaign behaviour – i.e., campaign effort, focus, and complexity – of dual candidates with 
that of constituency and regional list candidates. The findings show that candidacy type plays 
an important role in explaining candidates’ individual-level campaign behaviour. They reveal 
that dual candidates tend to conduct campaigns that are more intense as well as complex than 
the campaigns put in place by those who stand in one tier only. Furthermore, dual candidates 
tend to opt for a different campaign focus than both constituency and regional list candidates. 
Their campaign messages are not as party-centred as those of regional list candidates but also 
not as candidate-centred as those of constituency candidates. The electoral campaigns of dual 
candidates combine elements of campaigning under both candidate-centred and party-centred 
electoral systems. 
 
There are three broader points arising from this study and its findings. First, the fact that the 
campaign choices of dual candidates differ from those of their constituency and regional list 
counterparts implies that dual candidacy is a substantively distinct candidacy type. It is not 
just unique in name, whereby dual candidates’ actual patterns of behaviour conform to those 
associated with constituency candidates or regional list candidates, but empirically different 
as well. Whereas studies of legislative behaviour and representation have often found little 
difference between the parliamentary behaviour of MPs who had run as dual candidates and 
those who had run as constituency candidates (e.g., Gschwend et al. 2009; Lundberg 2006; 
Patzelt 1999), evidence is clearer when focusing on the campaign behaviour of different types 
of candidates. Dual candidates tend to campaign in a substantively different manner than their 
constituency and regional list counterparts. Candidacy type in mixed member systems should 
be conceptually thought of and empirically captured in broader terms than the basic SMD-PR 
dichotomy as dual candidacy is a distinct mode of candidacy in terms of campaign behaviour. 
 
Second, the findings indicate that the decision to allow or not to allow dual candidacy should 
not just be thought of as a normative one. Although the normative arguments remain relevant 
when discussing the virtues and vices of dual candidacy, so are the empirical implications of 
the decision. Dual candidates tend to conduct campaigns that are significantly more intense as 
well as complex than the campaigns of those who stand in one tier only. What this effectively 
means is that voters are likely to receive more electorally relevant information in the run up 
to the polling day and do so through a more diverse range of communication channels when 
dual candidacy is allowed. Given that it is widely accepted that more intense campaigns lead 
to more informed voters (e.g., Nai 2015; Partin 2001; Westlye 1991) and higher turnout (e.g., 
Geys 2006; Lassen 2005; Trumm and Sudulich 2018), both of which are seen to contribute to 
the health of a democracy, the empirical evidence presented here suggests that dual candidacy 
should be allowed in mixed member systems. It has positive impact on how voters experience 
electoral campaigns in the run up to the polling day. 
 
Finally, the findings uncovered here adhere to the ‘best of both worlds’ thesis associated with 
mixed member systems (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). Mixed member systems are seen to 
combine the local accountability and constituency focus associated with majoritarian systems 
with small group representation and proportionality associated with proportional systems. In 
doing so, they contain aspects of candidate-centred and party-centred electoral systems. Dual 
candidacy, which brings together the two electoral tiers in a crude manner, does the same. It 
combines elements of campaigning under both candidate-centred and party-centred electoral 
systems. The campaign effort and campaign complexity of dual candidates tends to be higher 
than that of candidates who stand in one tier only, whereas their campaign focus is an almost 
perfect harmony of the campaign messages of constituency and regional list candidates. The 
underlying premise of mixed member systems is not limited to its systematic effects. It is also 
evident when looking at the campaign behaviour of dual candidates.  
 
In summary, these findings broaden our understanding of how electoral institutions influence 
the campaign behaviour of parliamentary candidates in mixed member systems. It is widely 
accepted that electoral campaigns are shaped by country-specific factors as well as party- and 
candidate-specific characteristics. The empirical evidence offered here adds dual candidacy, 
and candidacy type more broadly, to this list. At the same time, it leaves room and highlights 
the need for expanding this research agenda. Future research into campaign patterns in mixed 
member systems should look at whether the effects of dual candidacy on campaign behaviour 
remain salient in the upcoming elections in Wales, compare the effects of candidacy type on 
candidates’ campaign behaviour in different mixed member systems, and evaluate the effects 
of candidacy type on additional aspects of candidates’ campaign behaviour. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A. 2016 Welsh Candidate Study 
The 2016 Welsh Candidate Study includes 158 candidates for whom it is known whether they 
got elected or not, their candidacy type, and their partisanship. Duncan index of dissimilarity 
is used to show that the survey sample is representative of the full population of candidates. It 
ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating greater discrepancy between the sample and 
the full population (Duncan and Duncan 1955). 
 
Table A1 shows the comparison between the sample and the full population. The comparison 
of candidacy type yields a value of 0.01, the comparison of partisanship a value of 0.07, and 
the comparison of electoral performance a value of 0.01. The survey sample is representative 
of the full population of candidates on all these key characteristics. 
 
Table A1. 2016 Welsh Candidate Study sample  
 Candidates (%) Sample (%) 
Partisanship   
Abolish the Welsh Assembly Party 4.4 5.1 
Plaid Cymru 14.0 13.3 
UKIP Wales 9.2 10.8 
Wales Green Party 8.8 9.5 
Welsh Communist Party 4.4 4.4 
Welsh Conservative Party 16.4 18.4 
Welsh Labour 12.5 12.0 
Welsh Liberal Democrats 10.7 12.7 
Welsh Trade Unionist and Socialist Coalition 4.4 3.2 
Other 15.3 10.6 
 Duncan index = 0.07 
Candidacy type   
Dual 21.0 21.5 
Constituency 33.5 33.5 
Regional list 45.5 44.9 
 Duncan index = 0.01 
Electoral performance   
Successful 13.1 12.0 
Unsuccessful 86.9 88.0 
 Duncan index = 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B. Robustness check 
Table B1 presents findings from models where candidates who officially stood for election in 
both electoral tiers but claimed they campaigned in one electoral tier only are coded, based on 
which tier it was, as constituency or regional list candidates. Estimates from these models are 
robust to those presented in Tables 2 and 3. 
 
Table B1. Alternative coding for candidacy type 
  Campaign effort Campaign focus Campaign complexity 
Candidacy type^    
Constituency -17.86** (7.84) -1.40** (0.62) -0.76** (0.26) 
Regional list -25.88** (8.19) 1.41** (0.54) -1.38** (0.30) 
Past AM 3.35 (8.79) -0.51 (0.86) -0.09 (0.43) 
Likelihood of success 8.20** (3.62) -0.27 (0.47) -0.09 (0.24) 
Ideological distance 1.76 (2.46) 0.29 (0.20) 0.03 (0.10) 
Gender -8.55** (4.28) 0.06 (0.44) -0.53** (0.21) 
Party^^    
Plaid Cymru 0.28 (9.43) 0.59 (0.85) -0.38 (0.37) 
Welsh Conservatives -12.96* (7.65) -0.36 (0.86) -0.42 (0.39) 
UKIP Wales -23.34** (8.75) 1.34 (0.99) -0.86* (0.44) 
Welsh Liberal Democrats -15.16 (9.90) 0.50 (0.98) -1.37** (0.51) 
Others -20.40** (7.80) 1.62 (0.90) -0.98** (0.39) 
Constant 62.66** (14.78) 5.94** (1.42)  
/cut1   -4.40 (0.78) 
/cut2   -4.10 (0.77) 
/cut3   -3.32 (0.75) 
/cut4   -2.91 (0.74) 
/cut5   -2.11 (0.74) 
Observations 143 147 133 
R2 / Log pseudolikelihood 0.36 0.35 -185 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05 
^ Reference category is dual   
^^ Reference category is Welsh Labour  
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Table 1. Campaign behaviour by candidacy type 
  Campaign effort Campaign focus Campaign complexity 
Candidacy type    
Dual 48.6 6.8 4.4 
Constituency 33.1 5.0 3.7 
Regional list 18.8 8.1 2.8 
T statistic    
Dual vs. constituency 2.21** 2.81** 2.37** 
Dual vs. regional list 5.41** -2.70** 5.09** 
Constituency vs. regional list 3.12** -6.36** 2.88** 
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Explaining variation in campaign effort and campaign focus 
 Campaign effort Campaign focus 
Candidacy type^   
Constituency -15.81** (7.79) -1.33** (0.66) 
Regional list -23.93** (7.89) 1.53** (0.52) 
Past AM 3.50 (8.86) -0.49 (0.86) 
Likelihood of success 8.56** (3.72) -0.24 (0.47) 
Ideological distance 1.62 (2.48) 0.30 (0.20) 
Gender -8.05* (4.45) 0.13 (0.46) 
Party^^   
Plaid Cymru 0.68 (9.68) 0.56 (0.87) 
Welsh Conservatives -12.85* (7.63) -0.37 (0.86) 
UKIP Wales -23.39** (8.87) 1.30 (1.00) 
Welsh Liberal Democrats -15.25 (9.98) 0.39 (0.99) 
Others -19.76** (7.78) 1.64* (0.90) 
Constant 59.27** (14.54) 5.69** (1.38) 
Observations 143 147 
R-squared 0.35 0.33 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05 
^ Reference category is dual 
^^ Reference category is Welsh Labour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Explaining variation in campaign complexity 
 Campaign complexity 
Candidacy type^  
Constituency -0.76** (0.28) 
Regional list -1.34** (0.30) 
Past AM -0.08 (0.43) 
Likelihood of success -0.07 (0.24) 
Ideological distance 0.02 (0.10) 
Gender -0.49** (0.21) 
Party^^  
Plaid Cymru -0.41 (0.37) 
Welsh Conservatives -0.43 (0.39) 
UKIP Wales -0.91** (0.45) 
Welsh Liberal Democrats -1.45** (0.52) 
Others -0.98** (0.39) 
Observations 133 
Log pseudolikelihood -185 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05 
^ Reference category is dual 
^^ Reference category is Welsh Labour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Campaign activities by candidacy type 
 Canvassing Leafleting Media Public debates Social networking 
Candidacy type      
Dual 82.4 78.1 97.0 97.0 91.2 
Constituency 80.8 78.9 73.5 63.5 76.9 
Regional list 70.6 76.5 55.4 36.9 57.6 
T statistic      
Dual vs. constituency 0.18 -0.08 2.88** 3.80** 1.71* 
Dual vs. regional list 1.28 0.18 4.62** 6.86** 3.63** 
Constituency vs. regional list 1.27 0.31 2.00** 2.93** 2.23** 
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05      
 
